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Introduction
The future of transport, and specifically, the question of how to achieve sustain-
able personal mobility, is a much- debated topic, considering environmental 
issues such as air pollution, inequality of access to mobility and urban traffic 
congestion. Further, growing concerns over climate change have put pressure on 
the transport sector to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. Transport accounts 
for approximately 25 per cent of the UK’s CO2 emissions, nearly two- thirds of 
which comes from cars and vans (CCC, 2014). There are also major concerns 
over air pollution and road congestion.
 However, changes to the road transport system are considered especially 
challenging. In the UK, like other countries in the developed world, road- based 
transport centred on the private car for personal mobility is dominant. 
Discourses among transport professionals and policymakers portray unrestricted 
mobility as a right (Doughty and Murray, 2016). A UK government- issued 
review on low- carbon cars opened with the statement ‘Road transport underpins 
our way of life’ (King, 2007, p. 3), and ties road transport with economic growth 
and technological progress, an approach still evident in the recent Industrial 
Strategy (HMG, 2017). The UK has a large automotive industry, with a turn-
over of £77.5 billion, employing over 800,000 people, including 169,000 in 
manufacturing (SMMT, 2017), making change politically and economically 
challenging. Overall, the UK is locked into automobility, where privately owned 
car use is reinforced by infrastructure, regulations, institutions, vested interests, 
norms, cultures and practices (Paterson, 2007; Schwanen, 2015; Urry, 2004). A 
significant shift towards sustainable personal mobility therefore requires systemic 
change – a sociotechnical transition.
 Various technological and cultural innovations exist with the potential to 
make transport more sustainable, such as low- emission vehicles, integrated 
transport, and car- sharing clubs. A prominent example is electric vehicles (EVs) 
– an innovation with technical potential to reduce emissions from road trans-
port, if powered by low- emission electricity. However, consumer uptake has 
been very slow, and EVs have met resistance from within the traditional auto-
motive industry and ambivalence from policymakers. That might be changing 
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with a variety of EVs available on the market in different countries. In the UK, 
sales have risen steeply in the past few years, with 37,000 new EVs1 registered in 
2016, and 47,000 in 2017 – nearly 1.9 per cent of total sales (SMMT, 2018). 
While EVs might leave many aspects of automobility intact, they have the 
potential to significantly change the transport system through diverse electrified 
transport not limited to cars, causing tension with existing industry, infrastruc-
ture and driving and refuelling norms.
 This chapter considers future visions of personal transport, as imagined by 
influential transport policy and automotive industry actors. It builds on a recent 
study (Bergman, 2017; Bergman et al., 2017) that looked at visions of the future 
of UK road transport, by analysing documents including forecasts, pathways and 
scenarios by diverse transport sector actors in order to explore how current chal-
lenges are perceived, what strategies these incumbent (i.e. regime) actors follow, 
and what role EVs might have. This chapter continues that research with a 
transitions theory perspective, complemented by concepts from institutional 
dynamics.
 The research found that regime actors’ visions reflect regime actor strategies: 
in most visions there is a similar trajectory of continued automobility, which 
offers little discontinuity or disruption compared to the present and recent past, 
but rather favours gradual change with conventional vehicles prominent in the 
medium term, and radical innovations institutionalised to reduce their threat. 
This chapter argues that the creation of visions is an act of ‘institutional work’ 
by incumbents, aimed at shaping the future to minimise change that could 
undermine their power.
 We next consider useful concepts from transition theory and institutional 
dynamics, and the role of visions of the future in these, before introducing the 
challenge of automobility and sustainable transport through these lenses.
Theoretical background
Transitions
This chapter considers two aspects of transition theory: First, regime actors and 
their strategies, and the dynamics of regime–niche interactions, for example, 
whether niche–regime relationships are competitive or symbiotic; the latter occurs 
when radical innovations are seen as complementary to the interests of regime 
actors and they become absorbed in the prevailing sociotechnical system (Geels 
and Schot, 2007). Bakker (2014) considers when incumbent actors might stra-
tegically support an innovation, considering that newly emerging systems might 
align with their short- or long- term interests, and that individual or collective 
expectations might guide them to engage with the innovation. Positive collective 
expectations of an innovation, which might serve an actor’s long- term interests, 
could lead to supporting a transition (and therefore the innovation) through 
influencing the configuration of the emerging system ‘just in case the transition 
does take place’ (Bakker, 2014, p. 65).
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 Second, potential future trajectories of the transport system, including per-
sonal mobility, could be viewed using the typology of transition pathways (Geels 
and Schot, 2007) described below. These pathways are archetypal, and a trans-
ition could involve elements of different pathways, or begin following one 
pathway and continue in another.2
 When there is ongoing moderate landscape pressure on the regime, but niches 
are not sufficiently developed to pose a threat, regime actors can respond by modi-
fying trajectories and innovation activities, possibly adopting ideas from niche 
innovations, with cumulative readjustments. The regime changes trajectory, but its 
basic architecture remains largely unchanged in a transformation pathway. In some 
instances, the adopted innovations trigger further changes in the architecture of 
the regime, with ongoing adoption leading to changes to rules, technologies, policy 
and user practices, all accumulating to a major reconfiguration. Struggles between 
policy actors and industry are possible in both these pathways (Smink et al., 2015).
 If a large, sudden landscape change occurs and incremental change is insuffi-
cient, the regime struggles in competition between incumbents and newcomers. 
If developed niche innovations exist, one innovation can ultimately break 
through to replace the existing regime, in a (technological) substitution. If, on the 
other hand, niches are insufficiently developed, regime actors might lose faith 
leading to collapse, or de- alignment, of the regime. There is a period of com-
petition between co- existing niches, leading to multiple innovation trajectories 
– but also uncertainty. Eventually, one niche will win out and a new regime will 
be formed, completing the de- alignment and re- alignment pathway.
 In the absence of strong landscape pressure, the regime exhibits dynamic 
stability in a reproduction pathway. Even in reproduction, regime actors need to 
act in order to maintain power.
Visions
It is well established that visions of the future, and the expectations they 
generate, are central to the process of technological innovation. Visions can 
motivate engineers and designers to initiate projects (van Lente, 1993), be used 
to attract financial support for research and innovation (Fujimura, 2003), and 
raise interest from a wide range of stakeholders, increasing an innovation’s legit-
imacy and uptake (Geels and Verhees, 2011; Schot and Geels, 2008). Studies 
like Levidow and Papaioannou (2013) suggest the importance of visions for 
innovation processes in personal transport, considering different innovation 
pathways for different visions.
 Uncertainty plays an important role in sustainability transitions, due to long 
time horizons and large investments, in which societal change and other (land-
scape) effects occur in addition to innovation and technological development. 
This suggests visions could be especially important in the transitions approach 
(Budde et al., 2012).
 Visioning is a deeply political technique. Visions created by regime actors are 
part of the sociotechnical system’s ‘culture’, and therefore might influence 
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expectations and strategies of all actors. Regime actors can use visioning exer-
cises to suit their ends: delay pressures, neutralise some risks and threats (e.g. 
perceived uncertainties over incumbent technologies ability to adapt) while 
sensitising audiences to others (e.g. end- users’ unfamiliarity with yet- to-be- 
proven technologies), and present the future as a more or less linear extrapola-
tion of the (recent) past. This is one reason why genuinely new or unexpected 
events or systemic changes are rarely considered in visioning exercises. Mean-
while, niche actors can deploy visions to enhance their legitimacy by building 
networks and gathering support and resources for their innovations (Schot and 
Geels, 2008).
Institutional dynamics
Recent thinking on institutional dynamics (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014; 
Geels, 2014; Smink et al., 2015) suggests that regime actors must work to uphold 
incumbent institutions, as these ‘do not automatically persist. Instead, they need 
constant maintenance’ (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2016, p. 301). Rather than 
reacting to developments, incumbents seek to proactively shape the institutions 
through which they interact with other social groups. This institutional work 
includes lobbying policymakers by incumbent firms and, vice versa, policy-
makers reaching out to incumbent service or technology providers; communica-
tion with the general public via advertising, press conferences and releases, and 
information/education campaigns; commissioning research and technical 
reports; the formulation of technical standards; and the shaping of discourse 
(Geels, 2014; Smink et al., 2015). In Multi- Level Perspective (MLP) terms, the 
dynamic stability of the regime is maintained by regime (incumbent) actors per-
forming institutional work to maintain power in the present and shape the 
future to reproduce present power structures.
 Pulling these strands together, this chapter suggests that visioning is a 
powerful and effective strategy of institutional work. First, because the formation 
of visions draws on the imagined future to justify action in the present 
(Anderson, 2010; McCormack and Schwanen, 2011). Second, because vision-
ing exercises allow actors to ‘craft’ development trajectories that suit their 
agendas. A vision of the future with clear expectations (Geels and Verhees, 
2011), framed as technological progress with market potential (Ruef and 
Markard, 2010) can help an innovation secure legitimacy and get the public 
onside (Walker et al., 2010).
Automobility
A powerful regime
The UK transport system is underpinned by the regime of automobility. This can 
be described by rules that favour privately owned cars; see car mobility as both 
a right and a necessity; link (car) mobility to economic development and 
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technological progress; and see cars as (capable of ) becoming green and clean 
through technological change (e.g. Schwanen, 2015). There are widely shared 
expectations of (relative) continuity of the system, and so far, the automobility 
regime has remained dynamically stable.
 Regime actors include the automotive industry and transport bodies, but also 
many planners, consultants and policymakers because their livelihoods and/or 
the wider social or political–economic orders of which they are part depend on 
automobility’s endurance (Cohen, 2012; Paterson, 2007; Unruh, 2000). Path 
dependencies also derive from the lifestyles of numerous households, and the 
sunk investments in road infrastructure and car manufacturers’ production pro-
cesses (Driscoll, 2014; Penna and Geels, 2015). Increasing returns and adaptive 
preferences, as well as ‘interlinked networks of dependency’ to the sociotechni-
cal systems of housing development and fossil fuel extraction further entrench 
the automobility regime (Driscoll, 2014; Penna and Geels, 2015; Urry, 2004; 
Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2012).
Potential for change
While the automobility regime is powerful and enduring, there are a range of 
landscape dynamics putting pressure on the regime in recent years, which might 
have weakened it in the long run, thereby opening a window of opportunity 
(Budde et al., 2012). Increased concerns over climate change and air pollution 
have led to tighter regulation and legislation. Private car use and ownership 
have stabilised and even declined across much of the Global North since around 
1990, especially among younger people and in cities – described as peak car 
(Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013). Cultural change has led to the image of the 
car shifting from an ‘icon of modernity’ to a more utilitarian perspective 
(Cohen, 2012). Finally, there seems to be a reduced commitment of policy-
makers to automobility (Geels, 2012), e.g. actors at the European Level (EU) 
level have increasingly challenged the automobility regime over the last 20 
years through regulations on CO2 emissions and proposed roadmaps towards sus-
tainable mobility (Weyer et al., 2015). In conjunction with these trends, there 
is a differentiation of strategy among car manufactures and other incumbents 
(Budde et al., 2012): different firms might make different choices in terms of 
investment in EVs, other technologies, or improved internal combustion engine 
vehicles (ICEVs).
 EVs may benefit from this differentiation as a long- standing innovation 
that has until now remained a niche. They offer a technological solution, 
while seemingly minimising behaviour and cultural change, although major 
infrastructural and industry changes are implied – including a reduction in oil 
consumption. Until recently, EVs had little involvement from regime actors 
(van Bree et al., 2010), with sales and performance too low to be considered a 
serious threat. However, this has changed in recent years. All major car manu-
facturers now produce EVs, suggesting that the industry has ‘picked its 
winning technology’ (Bakker and Farla, 2015). Moreover, recent sales across 
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the developed world, while still modest, suggest uptake is accelerating beyond 
the demonstration phase (Bakker and Farla, 2015; Nykvist and Nilsson, 
2015). There is undoubtedly increased hype around EVs, with the Organiza-
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countires (OPEC) increasing their 2040 
forecast for plug- in EVs by nearly 500 per cent from 2015 to 2016, and the 
International Energy Agency more than doubling its central forecast for 2030 
EV fleet size (BNEF, 2017). However, taking the long- term view of a trans-
ition, it is too soon to say if this is another hype cycle that will be followed by 
disappointment, or the beginning of a transition to electric transport.
What would a transition to EVs look like?
Looking at potential transitions to EVs in Germany, Augenstein (2015) finds 
discrepancies between visions of the future based on sustainable electric mobil-
ity, and strategies rooted in the current regime; battery EVs as a techno- fix could 
jeopardise ‘deeper’ sustainability transitions to lower car dependency. Augen-
stein concludes that EVs cannot simply replace ICEVs, as they are a radical 
innovation that does not fit the current mobility regime. Success depends on 
the emergence of ‘new functionalities’ (Geels, 2005) that ICEVs can’t offer, 
such as EV- based energy storage, or even EVs as mobile power supply and others 
we cannot predict. This could imply redefining the role of the car in society, 
matching the technological substitution pathway.
 Van Bree et al. (2010) construct future transport visions using transition 
pathways. Some of their scenarios envision government measures to reduce 
emissions as the main driver for change, forcing manufacturers to scale up low- 
carbon vehicles experiments. EVs winning out requires entrance of new actors 
and significant change to rules and practices (e.g. reduced driving range and 
overnight recharging), suggesting a transition pathway of regime de- alignment 
and re- alignment. Other scenarios envision consumer preferences and high 
fuel prices forcing manufacturers to change. EVs win out if fast recharging 
infrastructure is rolled out, with ongoing systemic changes suggesting regime 
reconfiguration.
 These different perspectives suggest a transition to EVs would cause signi-
ficant disruption to the automobility regime. It follows that regime actors would 
attempt to either prevent a transition to electric mobility, or reduce the disrup-
tion by performing maintaining institutional work, which can alter technology’s 
design, function, practices and image during its diffusion process (Fuenfschilling 
and Truffer, 2016). In transition terms, regime actors are expected to work 
towards a transformation pathway if reproduction is no longer tenable; however, 
the systemic changes EVs would cause to the entire transport system might 
make this more of a reconfiguration. Lending a historical perspective, Dijk et al. 
(2015) suggest that when EVs emerged in European markets in the mid- 1990s, 
the transport regime protected itself by transforming and adapting the poten-
tially disruptive innovations of EVs, by favouring hybrid cars (regime sustain-
ing) over battery–EVs (disruptive).
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 This chapter builds on previous work in considering the connection between 
visions of the future of personal mobility in the UK as they are constructed and 
used by incumbent (regime) actors and transition theory, specifically transition 
pathways and regime–niche interactions.
Methodology
The main research method was analysis of documents that discuss the UK’s 
transport future. Documents were found through online searches and references 
in reports and academic papers. These documents were written by, and for, a 
range of stakeholders in the UK transport sector, including government, indus-
try, consultancies and other bodies. Only documents that explicitly discuss EVs 
as part of the UK’s transport future, and which contain projections about the 
mid- term future (2020s through 2050s) were selected. Over 30 documents pub-
lished in 2002–2015 were identified and 16 were selected for in- depth textual 
analysis, still giving a wide range of perspectives. These are listed in Table 4.1.
 The documents were coded through quantitative content analysis. A priori 
coding included searches for projections of future transport and factors separat-
ing different scenarios, such as drivers and barriers for innovation and uptake. 
Further coding looked for emerging themes and narratives. Some qualitative 
analysis was also used to understand the tone and context and to infer actors’ 
agendas and strategies.3
 The documents appear to be dominated by visions from incumbents (regime 
actors). This might be partly an artefact of the research approach. However, this 
might also be (partly) a consequence of the deliberate attempts of incumbents to 
engage in institutional work seeking to absorb EVs into the deep structure that has 
ensured the survival of automobility since at least the Second World War (cf. 
Geels, 2011). Moreover, incumbents are more likely to possess the resources and 
skills to produce the sort of system- level visions that are considered here.
Findings: visions and trajectories
The analysed documents were produced by a range of actors and are different in 
style and substance. Some use model forecasts, some review scenarios from other 
sources, and some use heuristic scenarios or storylines, demonstrating what 
‘could be’ achieved. Nonetheless, there are some clear common themes emerg-
ing in the future trajectories, which one might call a ‘central vision’. This 
section explores the central vision, the factors and assumptions underlying it, 
and highlight trajectories which notably diverge from it. The timeline of the 
central vision is briefly described in Figure 4.1.
The central vision
The most striking feature of this near- consensus future is that almost all of the 
visions analysed are dominated by an assumption of continued automobility. 
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Even the most recent documents do not take into account the ‘peak car’ phe-
nomenon, but use long- standing, powerful discourse in which car- based road 
transport is central to mobility and tied to progress and economic growth. These 
visions assume that the UK’s high travel demand will continue through 2020, 
2030 or 2050, and that it will be met mostly through privately owned vehicles.
 Many of the forecasts focus on what technology or fuel will power the cars of 
the future, as opposed to how or how much people will travel, or the broader 
question of the role the (private) car in the future. The challenge of reducing 
emissions is therefore seen primarily as a technical question of the distribution 
of different vehicle types. While the great reduction in emissions is seen as chal-
lenging, in almost all detailed scenarios the targets are met.
 Another feature of the central vision is the link between automobility and a 
strong economy. Some documents explicitly link low- carbon vehicles (LCVs) 
to economic growth, suggesting the UK automotive industry can use its excel-
lence in ICEV production to reach the forefront of LCV production. Further, it 
In the years to 2020, emission reductions could be achieved 
through efficiency of conventional cars (ICEVs), sometimes 
considered ‘easy wins’ (CCC, 2014; DECC, 2011; EST, 2007; King, 
2007). Alternatively, electric vehicles (EVs) and other low-carbon 
vehicles (LCVs) could reach hundreds of thousands by 2020.
For 2030 the general picture is of mixed ICEVs and LCVs. Hybrids, 
plug-in hybrids and EVs, or a mixture of these technologies, are all 
possible, with fuel cell-powered cars plausible if EVs fail to deliver. 
However, uptake rates of LCVs vary significantly, depending on 
technological development and public attitudes; ICEVs are still a 
significant part of the stock. While details differ, most trajectories 
see an upturn in LCV uptake in the 2020s or 2030s.
The pressure of the 2050 target leads a couple of visions to 
suggest that 100 per cent of new cars need to be battery electric 
by 2035 (CCC, 2010) or ‘near zero tailpipe emissions’ for new cars 
by 2040 (DECC, 2011). Plug-in hybrids and battery EVs can lead 
to a 90 per cent reduction in emissions, reliant on decarbonisation 
of the grid (King, 2007; Lane, 2011), although some ICEVs are still 
expected to be on the road, probably hybrids. Overall, the 
suggestion is of almost complete decarbonisation of road 
transport by 2050.
2020
2030
2050
Figure 4.1 Timeline of the central vision.
Source: the author.
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is suggested that this engineering and manufacturing would deliver jobs and 
growth. Perhaps the most optimistic vision suggests the transition to LCVs has 
‘the potential to create jobs, rebalance the British economy towards manufac-
turing and exports, and promote sustainable economic growth in the UK’ (Straw 
and Rowney, 2013, p. 8).
Factors affecting trajectories
There are many factors that are seen as affecting EV trajectories, including tech-
nology, public acceptance and uptake, policy, and economic factors.
 Technological innovation is seen as a necessity for EVs to become mainstream 
in many visions, and most prominent is the battery – its performance, weight, 
price and reliability. Battery improvement is seen as essential for market pene-
tration, as EVs have to compete both with ICEVs and with other low- carbon 
technologies. Battery cost is often portrayed as the most significant and least 
controllable factor affecting EV market penetration, but battery weight and life-
time, range and recharging times are also considered significant barriers.
 While there is a common assumption that technological progress will act as a 
driver, uncertainty around specific technologies is commonly highlighted. This 
includes EVs, but also the rate of improvement in ICEVs and the rate of electri-
city decarbonisation; the collective effect is that the advantage of EVs is posi-
tioned as unknown (Dings, 2009; Lane, 2011). The earliest document (EST, 
2002) is highly pessimistic about EVs, considering hydrogen more promising. 
There is more optimism later, suggesting EV rollout depends only on price 
coming down, although there is also acknowledgement of hype around EVs (e.g. 
Dings, 2009).
 Technical issues and public acceptance issues overlap, for example, nearly 
every vision suggests that limited vehicle range and high upfront cost are crucial 
barriers to uptake. Lack of variety of car models and brands is seen as a barrier to 
uptake, suggesting EVs must mimic ICEVs in performance and choice, and meet 
expectations of comfort and speed, if they are to be widely purchased (CCC, 
2014; EST, 2007; King, 2007). It appears that, with increasing confidence in EV 
technology over time, there has been a shift towards greater focus on public 
acceptance and awareness, with EVs’ image seen as crucial to success. For 
example, Lane (2011) suggests manufacturers are rising to the challenge of 
developing low- carbon cars, leaving demand as the central obstacle.
 Many of the documents portray people as fairly homogenous consumers 
having a passive role in any transition, limited almost exclusively to the choice 
of vehicle they purchase. Other behaviours, such as modal shift, trip reduction 
and eco- driving are not linked to EV trajectories; they appear to be seen as too 
marginal to significantly affect car sales. This is tied to the assumption that 
technological breakthroughs are needed if EVs are to succeed because of the 
presumed behavioural inertia and resistance from users, leaving little room for 
adaptation among consumers. The central vision seeks to replace ICEVs with 
LCVs with limited behaviour change or other disruption, indirectly delaying 
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LCVs until they can easily replace ICEVs. So, despite highlighting the need to 
create and sustain acceptance demand for EVs, consumers are not generally per-
ceived as a driving force in the documents, in contrast with some scenarios of 
van Bree et al. (2010).
 The role of government through policy and legislation has been described as 
‘the single biggest influence on the future of low- carbon cars and fuels’ (Kay 
et al., 2013, p. 123). Various market interventions to support EVs are discussed, 
including subsidies to reduce upfront price; other incentives for purchase, such 
as free parking or bus- lane use; investment in technologies through R&D 
funding; demonstration and commercialisation programmes, such as procure-
ment of fleet vehicles; and supporting infrastructure.
 Visions are also affected by economic forecasts. Most notably, the economic 
downturn in 2008 led to a drop in car manufacturing volumes, leading Hazel-
dine et al. (2009) to base their scenarios on severity of recession and speed of 
recovery, as these could affect development and deployment of EVs. The Com-
mittee on Climate Change pushed back its 2010 estimate (CCC, 2010) of EVs 
reaching cost- effectiveness in the mid- 2020s to 2030 in a 2013 estimate (CCC, 
2013).
 These factors show that the central vision is not inevitable but relies on a 
variety of assumptions about the future. This makes it all the more important to 
contrast it with alternative visions, of which there are disappointingly few in 
these documents.
Specific trajectories of interest
A few visions have specific trajectories of interest, which challenge some of the 
assumptions above or stray significantly from the central vision. They both 
expose (often implicit) assumptions and agendas in the central vision and high-
light different responses to the challenges the regime faces.
 One vision (Kay et al., 2013) contrasts an ‘evolutionary’ EV trajectory, which 
fits the central vision, with a ‘revolutionary’ trajectory. In the latter, new market 
entrants revolutionise vehicle design and manufacturing, introducing Informa-
tion Computer Technology (ICT)-connected cars and compact, lighter (and 
therefore cheaper) designs suitable for shorter distances, leading to rapid uptake 
beginning in cities. The description suggests new functionalities, some still 
unknown, play a part. This is one of the only trajectories across all the analysed 
documents to suggest disruption, rather than incremental change, leading to 
greater institutional changes and potentially new norms around travel, a signi-
ficant deviation from the central vision.
 The Foresight work (Curry et al., 2006), based on consultations with stake-
holders from business, research and the public sector, is an outlier in its future 
visions. Its four scenarios are built around the two biggest uncertainties: whether 
technological progress will indeed deliver a low- carbon transport system, and 
whether people will accept intelligent infrastructure. Questioning the success of 
technology, independent from public acceptance, deviates from the consensus 
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vision, and allows for futures that depart significantly from the present and 
recent past. Questioning public acceptance and according a significant, active 
role to the wider population also contrasts with the central vision, where user 
practices are principally seen as barriers to EV uptake.
 Finally, the National Grid (2015) vision considers electricity use throughout 
the economy, including future projections of EVs. It differentiates trajectories 
by level of prosperity and level of ‘green ambition’. This is the only document 
that considers the level of social ambition to decarbonise the economy, as 
opposed to actions by government, industry or consumers. Only one of their 
four scenarios, which has an environmentally engaged society and moderate 
economic growth, achieves the UK’s renewable energy and emission reduction 
targets on time. This is the only document that explicitly constructs scenarios 
that fail to meet the targets, highlighting presumed success in many others.
Discussion and analysis
This section considers how the visions reflect actors’ strategies, offering an ana-
lysis from a transition pathways perspective and an institutional work per-
spective, noting that some actors might consider LCVs inevitable and are acting 
to create a new consensus about the future.
Transition pathways in the visions
Considering the four archetypal transition pathways (Geels and Schot, 2007), 
the central vision conforms best to the transformation pathway. While change is 
seen as inevitable following landscape pressures in the form of policies and 
targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it is envisioned as gradual, linear and 
hardly disruptive, with the main elements of automobility unchanged: transport 
is centred around privately owned cars; users are seen as consumers or drivers 
with high transport demand; large companies will shift over to making LCVs. 
While the arrival of new entrants is certainly possible, change is slow enough to 
allow many ICEV- producing incumbent firms to adapt. The transition dynamic 
is of regime actors adopting new technologies, gradually and almost seamlessly 
replacing ICEVs with LCVs (probably EVs). In other words, the regime reori-
ents its trajectory. This is not surprising, considering the visions come from 
regime actors with strong vested interests.
 Using the visions, regime actors craft possible futures in a way that makes the 
continuity of the sociotechnical regime more plausible. This is strengthened 
when visions by different actors converge towards a consensus or ‘central vision’. 
Regime actors seek certainty over future policy, as it is questionable whether 
LCVs can reach a big market without government regulation and investment in 
infrastructure and R&D.
 The transformation pathway sees incumbent manufacturers understanding the 
need for change, and over time ‘gradually increasing use of electrification in the 
powertrain’ (Kay et al., 2013, p. 125) as they develop EVs from existing models, all 
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without relinquishing power. This suggests extensive experimentation with altern-
ative technologies and fuels largely carried out or controlled by regime actors, in 
contrast to outsiders; it could be seen as niche absorption, making the regime more 
fit for purpose in a changing landscape through acquiring new attributes and 
changing its trajectory (Haxeltine et al., 2008). A similar dynamic is described in 
van Bree et al. (2010, p. 537): ‘Once carmakers become convinced that they can 
no longer address further tightening of regulations via adaptations of existing tech-
nology … and that non- compliance will lead to substantial (financial) con-
sequences, they scale up [fuel cell] and BEV experiments’.
 In contrast, the ‘revolutionary’ trajectory (Kay et al., 2013) has elements of a 
technological substitution, where ICT- connected EVs taking off in cities leads to 
significant change in institutions and norms, disrupting the ICEV- based regime. 
The regime is found not fit for purpose when the landscape changes, and a more 
suitable niche innovation breaks through, changing not only the technology, 
but resulting in new travel norms and institutional changes.
 In the Foresight visions (Curry et al., 2006), the ‘Urban Colonies’ scenario 
combines low- impact transport with strong public attitudes reducing acceptance 
of intelligent infrastructure, leading to a world where technological investment 
is focused on reducing environmental impact. Compact cities with a local focus 
reduce the need for travel, and transport is restricted to cleaner forms. This 
could be seen as a reconfiguration with extensive changes to infrastructure, insti-
tutions and travel norms, in contrast to the central vision.
 The Foresight ‘Tribal Trading’ scenario (Curry et al., 2006) envisions a world 
after a severe energy shock, with the global economy damaged and infrastruc-
ture falling into disrepair. Transport has high environmental impact and is 
greatly reduced, with mobility no longer seen as a right. This trajectory has ele-
ments of de- alignment and re- alignment, where regimes collapse from strong pres-
sure, and new ones emerge in a very different world. This contrasts sharply with 
the lack of disruption or discontinuity in the central vision.
 In summary, disruptive change is unrealistically lacking in the central 
vision. The smooth transition does not take into account the radical nature of 
EVs which might rely on ‘new functionalities’ to succeed (Augenstein, 2015) – 
as opposed to a direct one- for-one replacement of ICEVs with EVs. It is 
important to appreciate that the regime of automobility is not entirely homo-
geneous or free from tensions; one disruption clearly lacking in the visions is 
change in fuel provision, as road transport is the biggest global source of oil 
demand. A shift to EVs would affect supply chain actors in the automobility 
system, requiring a significant reconfiguration of part of the regime. The lack of 
disruption is also evident in the paucity of scenarios in which emission targets 
are missed. Even economic disruption (recession) is seen as temporarily redu-
cing car sales and delaying LCV development and deployment but does not 
challenge the regime. This analysis suggests that the central vision is closest to the 
transformation pathway not because of inevitability or likelihood, but because it best 
suits incumbent actors’ agendas. This use of visions could be defined as institu-
tional work, as described below.
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Visions as institutional work
Creating visions can be seen as a strategy that regime actors use to maintain or 
restore institutional structures, by expressing expectations about the (long- term) 
future in order to influence the present (and near future). This section high-
lights some strategies deployed within these visions to neutralise the potentially 
disruptive nature of radical or niche innovations.
 The visions show a varied, and sometimes contradictory, mix of imagined 
roles and responsibilities for government and policy. On the one hand, there are 
calls for non- meddling support for manufacturing, and on the other, recom-
mendations that government work together with industry to develop the future 
of the automotive strategy in the UK. There are various calls for government to 
ensure funding for research and development (R&D) and not just basic research, 
and to guarantee long- term support for purchase in order to sustain demand, 
creating certainty for the industry. This suggests a recognition that creating a 
successful, sustained EV market is non- trivial and requires intervention and 
(financial) support. Uptake is seen as one of the biggest challenges and most 
documents identify ways to incentivise users through financial instruments, such 
as grants or subsidies for purchase, and some also suggest ways to raise awareness 
and improve EVs’ image.
 Both the call for government to tackle barriers to uptake and support the 
markets, and the focus on users and demand, arguably work to shift responsibil-
ities for change away from manufacturers towards the state and civil society. 
These calls have a neoliberal character, minimising risk to the private sector 
and allowing industry actors their freedom without bearing full responsibility for 
emissions reduction targets, while potentially public and private sector grow 
closer. From an institutional perspective, this can be seen as enabling work, ‘the 
creation of rules that facilitate, supplement and support institutions’ (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006, p. 230).
 From a regulation perspective, documents from a range of actors call for gradu-
ally, but significantly, tightening emission targets. This would allow both 
improvement of ICEVs and increased uptake of LCVs, ‘[giving] the industry the 
required long- term security for investments in low- carbon car technology and 
infrastructure’ (Dings, 2009, p. 7). There are calls for regulations to ‘capture 
well- to-wheel (or even life cycle) emissions’ (Kay et al., 2013, p. xi). However, 
this could increase uncertainties around EVs since their well- to-wheel and life- 
cycle emissions depend on the electricity grid and the wider vehicle manufac-
ture process, respectively. Institutionally, this could be seen as a delay tactic, 
favouring incumbents in the short term, while allowing them time to adapt.
 Many of the documents recommend ‘technology neutrality’, the assumption 
that with the right supporting policies, markets will choose the best options 
among fuel and engine technologies through competition and deliver required 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions with no major changes to mobility traject-
ories. Several documents call on government to ensure a level playing field 
rather than pick winners, stressing manufacturers’ support for a technology 
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neutral approach. Some government documents reaffirm allowing industry to 
develop the low- carbon technologies most appropriate for users. Government 
and industry seem to be reassuring each other through the narrative of techno-
logical neutrality, possibly a sign of a regime alliance between incumbents and 
policymakers (Geels, 2014). This could be interpreted simply as prudent gov-
ernment action in the face of technological uncertainty: hesitation by the state 
has been observed elsewhere in relation to EVs and is particularly likely when 
the free market paradigm prevails (Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015). For the industry, 
this could be another delay tactic that preserves the regime’s stability as ICEV 
improvements can meet emission targets in the short term.
 This analysis highlights the profoundly political nature of visioning, seeking 
to order the institutional constellation and identify and assign responsibilities to 
different groups of actors. Delay tactics prevent more profound changes, allow-
ing more efficient ICEVs (or hybrids) to continue their dominance in coming 
years. Industry seeks close alliance with the government with public investment 
and assurances, while arguing for regulatory approaches that favour incumbents 
to minimise risk.
 Finally, some factors are under- emphasised in the central vision. Behaviour 
changes beyond choice of vehicle for purchase are portrayed as marginal, and 
the heterogeneity of mobility patterns and complexity of awareness and accept-
ance of LCVs are simplified. Deeper changes to the automobility system are 
almost entirely absent. These could include infrastructural shifts, such as 
compact cities that reduce the need for personal motorised travel or shifting 
norms away from seeing high travel demand as normal and high mobility as a 
right. Even the observed trend of peak car is ignored. The central vision is limited 
in scope, hindering genuine transformation, as the unsavoury parts of the transition 
are downplayed, problematised or ignored.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
This chapter has analysed visioning documents of the future of the UK’s system 
for personal transport, integrating lessons from transition pathways and institu-
tional dynamics. The focus is on the role of EVs, in the context of growing land-
scape pressure of climate change- related policy to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from transport.
 Some regime actors might consider LCVs to be inevitable, and others might 
be supporting EVs in order to hedge their bets, and to serve their agendas by 
influencing the future configuration of the system (Bakker, 2014). Either way, 
regime actors are working to define future trajectories and make the emerging 
niche as regime- symbiotic as possible, using visioning documents among other 
things. They work for slower change, by pressing for a continued high demand, 
private car- based personal transport system, which allows ICEVs to persist for 
years to come, and crucially – acts for LCVs to adapt to current automobility, 
rather than allowing the mobility system to adapt to and be shaped by these 
technologies. From a transitions perspective, when landscape pressures make the 
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dynamically stable reproduction pathway untenable, some incumbents work 
towards a transformation pathway, which minimises disruption and allows many 
regime actors to maintain power.
 One of the most striking features of the central vision is the focus on incre-
mental change with an almost complete lack of discontinuities or serious disrup-
tions to the regime or the transport system more generally. This matches other 
recent research that found that ‘alternative visions of mobility that really might 
challenge the incumbent regime are rather rare’ (Weyer et al., 2015, p. 20). This 
is unrealistic, as EVs cannot simply replace conventional cars without allowing 
new approaches to vehicle manufacture or design by new entrants (Kay et al., 
2013), perhaps even redefining the role of the car in society (Augenstein, 2015). 
The fuel shift away from oil would itself be hugely disruptive to the system and 
is not engaged with in these trajectories. This vision is limited, and limiting, in 
scope, potentially preventing a deeper transition towards sustainability by 
locking out alternative futures and limiting EVs to the role of a techno- fix, 
rather than explore vast possibilities of electrical mobility. For example, EVs’ 
role as electricity storage is a common topic in electricity futures, but its effect 
on travel practices should be considered in transport futures.
 The main recommendation for policymakers is to engage with visions that 
include a larger variety of futures. These must include scenarios of disruption 
and shocks to the system, and possibilities of failing to meet emission reduction 
and other targets. This could be achieved by commissioning visioning docu-
ments from a larger variety of actors, including outsiders and niche players, who 
can challenge, rather than support, futures such as the central vision described 
here. This would offer more scope and choice for policymakers to meet policy 
goals and targets and leave us better prepared for foreseeable and unforeseeable 
changes to transport in the future.
Notes
1 This includes both battery–electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug- in hybrids.
2 In this chapter, trajectories describe possible unfolding transport futures, while pathways 
are theoretical, archetypal trajectories, like those detailed in the transitions literature.
3 For a detailed explanation of the methodology, see Bergman et al. (2017).
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